



Justice Reinvestment in Alabama

1st Presentation to Prison Reform Task Force
June 10, 2014

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
Council of State Governments Justice Center

- National non-profit, non-partisan membership association of state government officials
- Engages members of all three branches of state government
- Justice Center provides practical, nonpartisan advice informed by the best available evidence




Justice Reinvestment


a data-driven approach to reduce corrections spending and reinvest savings in strategies that can decrease recidivism and increase public safety



Key Characteristics about Justice Reinvestment Process



18 States Have Used a Justice Reinvestment Approach with Assistance from the CSG Justice Center



National Conservative Leaders Making the Case for More Effective Criminal Justice Policy




The Washington Post

“But on issues of sentencing reform and prison recidivism, Republicans — especially several governors in Southern states — have been the leaders, earning praise from prison reform groups on both sides of the aisle for efforts to save money by implementing rehabilitation programs and curbing skyrocketing prison costs.”

Source: Lowery, Wesley, “Conservatives try to make criminal justice reform a signature issue,” *Washington Post*, March 7, 2014.

Logo source: www.rightoncrime.com and www.cpac.org

Ten Southern States Have Enacted Criminal Justice Reforms Since 2007



North Carolina



Commissioner Guice

North Carolina Division of Adult Corrections and Juvenile Justice

"We want to improve our criminal justice system and protect the public, and we recognize that our system can accomplish this goal in a less costly fashion."

Texas



Senator Whitmire

"You can always lock somebody up ... And it's not always the toughest thing. The toughest thing you can do, and probably the most conservative thing you can do, is prevent the next crime."

Mississippi



Governor Bryant

"We pledged to Mississippians that we would make this the 'public safety session,' and we have worked hard to develop a research-based plan that is tough on crime while using tax dollars wisely."

State Leadership Requested Assistance to Address Alabama's Criminal Justice Challenges



STATE OF ALABAMA
LEGISLATURE
11 SOUTH UNION STREET
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36130

February 26, 2014

Juliene James
Senior Policy Advisor
Bureau of Justice Assistance
810 Seventh Street, SW
Washington, DC 20531

Adam Gelb
Director, Public Safety Performance Project
The Pew Charitable Trusts
901 E St. NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20004

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Justice Reinvestment Initiative
Urban Institute
2100 M Street, NW
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
Dear Ms. James, Mr. Gelb and Ms. Cramer:


Alabama would like to participate in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative request for Justice Reinvestment technical assistance to help our state effective corrections policies and reinvest in strategies to increase public comes with a full understanding of the Justice Reinvestment process, ho in Alabama, and a full commitment to succeed. We are dedicated to working Justice Assistance, and the Council implement cost-effective, evidence-b justice system.




Alabama is committed to increasing public safety and improving our approach to criminal justice by engaging in this data driven process. We believe that justice reinvestment technical assistance will help us achieve our goals, and we would welcome and greatly appreciate your support.


Sincerely,


Governor Robert Bentley
State of Alabama


Chief Justice Roy Moore
Alabama Supreme Court


Speaker Mike Hubbard
Alabama House of Representatives


President Pro Tempore Del Marsh
Alabama Senate


Senator Cam Ward
Chairman, Joint Prison Committee


Commissioner Kim Thomas
Department of Corrections

...Alabama is interested in analyzing...and developing policy options around...

- Court procedures and sentencing
- Data on reported crime and arrests
- Problem-solving court policies
- Felony probation and parole supervision
- Behavioral health
- Jails and misdemeanor probation
- Prison admissions and length of stay
- Corrections and parole processes
- Community corrections
- Recidivism rates

Two Phases of Justice Reinvestment

Phase I

Analyze Data and Develop Policy Options

- Analyze data
 - crime/arrests, courts, corrections, and supervision trends
- Solicit input from stakeholders
- Assess quality of investments in efforts to reduce recidivism
- Develop policy options and estimate impacts

Phase 2

Implement New Policies

- Identify assistance needed to implement policies effectively
- Deploy targeted reinvestment strategies to increase public safety
- Track the impact of enacted policies/programs
- Monitor recidivism rates and other key measures

Typical Timeline for Justice Reinvestment *Phase I* Process

Phase I - Analyze Data & Develop Policy Options

Collect and Examine Quantitative Data

- Reported crime and arrests
- Jail data
- Court dispositions and sentencing
- Risk/Needs
- Probation supervision
- Community corrections
- Prison admissions, population and releases
- Parole decisions and supervision

Engage Stakeholders

- Judges
- Prosecutors
- Defense Bar
- Parole Board
- County Officials
- Behavioral Health Providers
- Victims/Advocates
- Faith-Based Leaders
- Probation Officers
- Parole Officers
- Law Enforcement

Develop and present a comprehensive analysis of the state's criminal justice system

Develop a framework of policy options that together would increase public safety and reduce/avert taxpayer spending

6 to 9 months

2 to 3 months

Structures Providing Support and Direction to Justice Reinvestment Project

Bipartisan, Inter-branch Coordination



Executive

Judicial

Legislative

High Level Working Group



Agency
Directors

Policymakers


Stakeholders

Other support needed for effective technical assistance:


CJ System Stakeholder Leadership

Assist in accessing data, review of preliminary data findings, advice for engaging association membership, guidance on statewide issues, and distribution of surveys and assistance with scheduling focus groups

Understand Broader System Trends — Prison Data Alone Won't Answer Essential Questions



Example of Justice Reinvestment Data Analysis and Stakeholder Engagement in Oklahoma



Detailed, Case-Level Data Sought from Many Sources

Data Type	Source	Status
– Sentencing	Sentencing Commission	In Process
– Prison	Department of Corrections	In Process
– Probation Supervision	Board of Pardons and Paroles	In Process
– Parole Decision-Making		
– Parole Supervision		
– Risk Assessment		
– Jail	Counties	Still scoping
– Community Corrections		
– Problem Solving Courts		
– Behavioral Health Data	Department of Mental Health	Still scoping
– Crime and Arrests	Criminal Justice Information Center	Awaiting Response

Roadblocks that sometimes arise

Shortage of data staff

Delays in delivery due to “data cleaning”

Unavailable data instead collected through samples and surveys

Agencies unaccustomed to sharing data with outside groups



Criminal Justice Trends in Alabama

Guiding Principles

Justice Reinvestment Case Studies

Criminal Justice Trends in Alabama




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graph TD; A[Criminal Justice Trends in Alabama] --- B[Guiding Principles]; B --- C[Justice Reinvestment Case Studies];
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Guiding Principles

Justice Reinvestment Case Studies

Crime Has Decreased Despite Growing State Population

State Population and Reported Index Crimes, 2000 – 2012



Alabama’s resident population increased 8.2% from 2000 to 2012.


- 2000 pop = 4,452,173
- 2012 pop = 4,817,528

During the same period, reported crime fell by 5% .

Source: U.S Census Bureau, Population Division; *Crime in Alabama* Annual Reports, Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center.

Despite Falling Crime, Alabama Continues to Have Some of the Higher Crime Rates in the Nation

Alabama and US Crime Rates, 2012



Alabama's Ranking Among States for 2012 Crime Rates:


- ❑ Total Crime: 8th Highest
- ❑ Violent Crime: 14th
- ❑ Property Crime: 7th

Violent crime rate nationally fell more than 15% from 2008 to 2012.

➤ Alabama's fell less than 2%.

Statewide Volume of Arrests Has Declined by More than 50,000 Since 2008


Statewide Arrests, 2008-2012



% Change in Arrests Since 2008:

- Violent Index: down 11%
- Property Index: down 9%
- Simple Assault: down 19%
- Drug: down 40%
- DUI: down 27%


Arrests for Select Offense Types, 2008-2012



Note: Number of sworn officers up by 3% since 2008.


Source: Crime in Alabama Annual Reports, Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center.

Felony Court Activity Has Declined in Recent Years




Source: Annual Report and Statistics, Alabama Unified Judicial System.

Possible Sentencing Dispositions for Felony Convictions Are Quite Complex and Nuanced



Number of People Supervised on Felony Probation Has Declined Almost 10% Since 2008




- Why is the felony probation population declining?*
- *Fewer being sentenced to probation?*
 - *More being revoked from probation?*
 - *Both?*

Between 2008 and 2013, the average probation and parole officer caseload increased from 178 to 192.

Source: Annual Reports and Quarterly Population Statistics, Management Reports, Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Felony Probation Revocations Declined from 2009 to 2011 but Have Since Increased


Felony Probation Revocations, 2008-2013



Further analysis will look into where these probationers are being revoked: prison versus jail.


- 22% decline in revocations from 2009 to 2011
- 12% increase from 2011 to 2013

Reason for Revocation, 2013




Large share of revocations involving new criminal behavior represents opportunity for improving public safety.

Admissions to ADOC Have Increased Almost 2% Since 2008



Source: Annual Reports, Alabama Department of Corrections.

Due to Level of Prison Overcrowding, Many Individuals Admitted to ADOC Do Not Go to Prison



In 2013, only 74% of those admitted to ADOC's jurisdiction were admitted to prison.


Those not admitted to ADOC custody upon sentencing could be admitted to the following:

- ✓ Community Corrections upon order of the court
- ✓ County Jail while waiting for space to open up in ADOC facilities (contract for those more than 30 days from sentencing)

Source: Annual Reports, Alabama Department of Corrections.

ADOC's Population Resides in Many Different Places

End of Fiscal Year ADOC Jurisdictional Population



ADOC's "custody" population includes those in major ADOC facilities, work centers and work release, supervised re-entry, and contract facilities.

➤ Growth in "custody" population from 2008 to 2013 was driven primarily by increase in contract facilities (+709).


Source: Annual Reports and Monthly Reports, Alabama Department of Corrections.

Parole Approval Rates Have Fallen by Almost a Third in the Past Six Years



Source: Annual Reports, Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Number of Prisoners Released to Probation Is Increasing While Number Released to Parole Is Decreasing




The declining number of parole releases since 2010 (-942) is driving the decline in overall ADOC Custody releases (-1,136).

Source: Annual Reports, Alabama Department of Corrections.

For Five of Past Six Years, Admissions to ADOC Custody Have Outpaced Releases


ADOC “Custody” Admissions and Releases, 2008-2013



There have been 2,266 more admissions than releases since 2008.

Alabama's Prisons Are Operating at 190% of Designed Capacity

ADOC Population and Capacity, 2002 – 2013



What would it cost Alabama to build its way out of the current situation?

Achieving 130% operational capacity requires adding 6,000 prison beds:


- ❖ Construction costs = \$420m
- ❖ Annual operating costs = \$93m

Achieving 100% operational capacity requires adding 12,000 prison beds:

- ❖ Construction costs = \$840m
- ❖ Annual operating costs = \$186m

Source: Annual Reports and Monthly Reports, Alabama Department of Corrections; Alabama Legislative Fiscal Office estimates \$102 million construction cost for 1,500 bed facility; ADOC inmate operating cost = \$42.54 per day, 2012 Annual Report.

Recent BJS Report Shows Alabama Among the Highest in Adult Incarceration Rankings




Rank	Adult Prison Incarceration Rate			
	2011		2012	
1	Louisiana	1,144	Louisiana	1,179
2	Mississippi	921	Mississippi	954
3	Texas	866	Oklahoma	858
4	Alabama	848	Alabama	847
5	Oklahoma	838	Texas	820
6	Arizona	784	Arizona	773
7	Georgia	731	Georgia	723
8	Arkansas	718	Idaho	680
9	Florida	678	Missouri	674
10	Missouri	669	Florida	661
11	Idaho	666	Arkansas	651


Source: *Prisoners in 2011 and Prisoners in 2012- Advance Counts*, Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Dept. of Justice.

Changing Incarceration Rates Don't Necessarily Correspond with Changing Crime Rates

**Incarceration Rate
2000-2012**



**Violent Crime Rate
2000-2012**



Source: *Prisoners in 2000* and *Prisoners in 2012- Advance Counts*, and *Crime in the U.S. 2012* , FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Online Data Tool, Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Dept. of Justice.

Summary of High-Level Criminal Justice Trends

Overall crime and arrests down since 2008

- But crime in Alabama remains high compared to rest of nation

Declining felony probation supervision population

- Yet more revocations since 2011, primarily for new offenses

Admissions to ADOC custody outpacing releases

- Causing overall growth and greater reliance on leased beds

Parole approval rate dropped by almost one-third

- Resulting in falling numbers released from prison

State-run facilities operating at 190% of capacity

- Would cost hundreds of millions to build out of problem



Criminal Justice Trends in Alabama

Guiding Principles

Justice Reinvestment Case Studies

Policy Development Tied to Principles of Focusing Resources and Avoiding Shifting of Burdens

The Goal: Contain corrections costs and increase public safety



Combine policy options with reinvestment based on “what works” to reduce recidivism

Avoid shifting burdens elsewhere in the system and help relieve pressures at the local level



Knowledge on Improving Criminal Justice Outcomes Has Increased Dramatically Over the Last 20 Years

Academics and practitioners have contributed to this growing body of research


Risk Principle of Case Classification in Correctional Treatment
A Meta-Analytic Investigation

International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology
Volume 50/Number 1
February 2006 85-100
© 2006 Sage Publications
10.1177/0306624X05282556
http://ijt.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com

Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects
by Francis T. Cullen and Paul Gendreau

A theme that has persisted throughout the history of American corrections is that efforts should be made to reform offenders. In particular, at the beginning of the 1900s, the rehabilitative ideal was enthusiastically trumpeted and helped to direct the reorganization of the correctional system (e.g., implementation of indeterminate sentencing, parole, probation, a separate juvenile justice system). For the next seven decades, offender treatment reigned as the dominant correctional philosophy. Then, in the early 1970s, rehabilitation suffered a precipitous reversal of fortune. The larger disruptions in American society in this era prompted a general critique of the "state-run" criminal justice system. Rehabilitation was blamed by liberals for allowing the state to act coercively against offenders, and was blamed by conservatives for allowing the state to act leniently toward offenders. In this context, the death knell of rehabilitation was seemingly sounded by Robert Martinson's (1974b) influential "nothing works" essay, which reported that few treatment programs reduced recidivism. This review of evaluation studies gave legitimacy to the antirehabilitation sentiments of the day; it ostensibly "proved" what everyone "already knew": Rehabilitation did not work.

Francis T. Cullen is Distinguished Research Professor of Criminal Justice with the



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Research • Development • Evaluation

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS
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Crime SOLUTIONS.gov

RELIABLE RESEARCH. REAL RESULTS.

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TOPICS | All Programs & Practices | About CrimeSolutions.gov | Resources | FAQs | Nominate

Access New Practice Evaluations

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About CrimeSolutions.gov

The Office of Justice Programs' CrimeSolutions.gov uses rigorous research to inform practitioners and policy makers about what works in criminal justice, juvenile justice, and crime victim services.

On CrimeSolutions.gov you will find:


- Research on the effectiveness of programs and practices as reviewed and rated by Study Reviews
- Easily understandable ratings based on the evidence that indicates whether a program or practice achieves its goals: (see [Program Review and Rating from Start to Finish](#) and [Practice Review and Rating from Start to Finish](#))
 - Effective ☒
 - Promising ☒
 - No Effects ☐
- Profiles of programs and practices with research findings

What is the difference between programs and practices on CrimeSolutions.gov?

	Programs	Practices <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Description	A specific set of activities carried out according to guidelines to achieve a defined purpose	A general category of programs, strategies, or procedures that share similar characteristics with regard to the issues they address and how they address them
Question Answered	How effective is this program according to the most rigorous evaluation(s) available?	How effective is this general practice on average across many evaluations?
Example	Did the ABC Mentoring Program in Anytown, USA achieve its goals?	Does mentoring usually achieve its goals?
Evidence Ratings	Single evidence rating per program	Single evidence rating for each outcome affected by the practice
Evidence Base	Up to 3 rigorous evaluations of a specific program	Meta-analyses that assess the average effectiveness of the practice on various outcomes across a large number of studies

• [Practice Review and Rating from Start to Finish](#) ☒
• [Practice Rating Instrument](#)
• [Nominate a Program or Practice for CrimeSolutions.gov](#)
• [CrimeSolutions.gov](#)


Reducing Criminal Behavior Requires Focusing on Risk, Need, and Responsivity




Identify and Focus on Higher-Risk Offenders

Who?

Without Risk Assessment...



With Risk Assessment...




Risk of Re-offending

LOW 10% re-arrested	MODERATE 35% re-arrested	HIGH 70% re-arrested
---------------------------	--------------------------------	----------------------------

Target the Factors that Evidence Shows Are Most Central to Criminal Behavior

What?



Antisocial

The Big Four


(impacting these are the major drivers to reducing criminal behavior)

Higher-risk offenders are likely to have more of the **Big Four**.

Programs targeting these factors can significantly lower recidivism rates

* Past criminality cannot be changed.

After Getting the Who and the What, Supervision and Programming Should Be Well Targeted



Elements of Effective Supervision

Dosage/Intensity

Focus supervision officer time and program resources on the highest-risk offenders.

Consistency

Use a graduated range of sanctions and incentives to guide specific type of response to violations and compliance.


Swiftiness

Enable officers to respond meaningfully to violations without delay or time-consuming processes.

Cost-effectiveness

Prioritize the most expensive, restrictive sanctions for offenders committing the most serious violations.

Risk Principle in Action: Keeping High and Low Risk Separate



HIGH RISK OFFENDERS

Intensive Services for a longer period of time

- Face to face contacts; home visits, school/work visits
- More drug testing
- Different programs/treatment groups/services for high risk offenders




LOW RISK OFFENDERS

- Have fewer problems
- Do not require intensive interventions/supervision
- If they don't need it; don't give it to them

DO NOT MIX

Violating the Risk Principle Leads to Recidivism




HIGH RISK OFFENDERS

Under supervised & **under** treated

Example: High risk substance abuser given AA/NA treatment → increased risk of recidivating.

WHY?

- Does not provide enough **supervision/control** to reduce recidivism
- Does not provide enough **intensity of programming** to disrupt risk factors



LOW RISK OFFENDERS



Over supervised & **over** treated

At best, leads to no reductions in recidivism. At worst, causes harm and increases recidivism

WHY?

- Disrupts the very things that make the offender low risk
- Low risk offenders learn from high risk offenders

Intensity of Services Can Have Positive or Negative Impacts on Recidivism, Depending on Risk




Intensive interventions led to BETTER recidivism outcomes for HIGH risk offenders, but....

.... intensive interventions led to WORSE recidivism outcomes for LOW risk offenders.

Ensure Programs Are High Quality and Properly Implemented

How Well?

Program Effectiveness



What works with offender programming?

Who:

Programs that target high-risk individuals are more likely to have a significant impact on recidivism.


What:

Certain programs are more effective than others - effectiveness can relate to the **type** of program and **where** it is delivered (in a prison vs. in the community).

How Well:

Assessing how well a program is executed can reveal whether or not a program has the capability to deliver evidence-based interventions.

Responsivity Dictates Skillful Program Delivery



Responsivity Factors

INTERNAL RESPONSIVITY FACTORS

- Motivation
- Mental health: anxiety, psychopathy
- Maturity
- Transportation
- Cognitive deficiencies
- Language barriers
- Demographics

EXTERNAL REPNOSIVITY FACTORS


- Program characteristics
- Facilitator characteristics
- Program setting

Examples of Responsivity Barriers:

- Visual learning style in an “audio” program
- Illiterate offender in group with reading/writing requirements
- Single mother with no child care during program time

Where and How Treatment Is Delivered Impacts the Degree of Recidivism Reduction


Research shows that programs delivered in the community have greater impacts on recidivism



Hawaii HOPE Reduces Re-Arrest, Drug Use, Jail Use

Hawaii HOPE

Intensive, random drug testing with swift, certain, and brief jail sanctions.



- Key principles of HOPE - **swift and certain probation violation response practices** - are being replicated with success in other jurisdictions.

Key Factors Associated with Successful Models of Swift and Certain Sanctioning

- ☐ Clear rules and violation responses so probationer is aware of expectations and consequences
- ☐ Strict monitoring
- ☐ Prompt sanction within days of detection
- ☐ Proportionate sanctions, tied to severity and risk
- ☐ Ability to bring violators into custody
- ☐ Compulsory treatment when appropriate

Challenges to Implementation of Supervision Practices Utilizing Swift & Sure Principles

Lack of Training

- Critical for judges, prosecutors, and supervision managers and agents to be well-informed about the principles and research behind swift/certain sanctioning

Judicial and Court Staff

- For models relying on court hearings for violation responses

Legal Structure for Administrative Responses

- Necessary for clarifying limited nature of sanctioning authorities available to agents, spelling out judicial oversight, and preservation of due process rights

Collaboration with Key Stakeholders

- Law enforcement resources to assist with arrest and detention

Drug testing

Different Approaches to Swift and Sure Policies Have Yielded Positive Results in Other States

Georgia POM


Enabling probation officers to employ administrative sanctions & probationers to waive violation hearings **reduced jail time three-fold**, reduced time spent in court, and increased swiftness of responses to violations.

North Carolina: Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011

- Sweeping changes to sentencing, supervision and sanctioning practices— including risk/need assessments in targeting treatment & supervision
- Probation agents able to order “quick dip” stays in jail up to 3 days upon detecting a violation
- ***Since 2011:*** probation revocations to prison are down by 40%, and the prison population has decreased by 9% (4,000 people).

Source: *An Evaluation of Georgia's Probation Options Management Act*, Applied Research Services, October 2007; Automated System Query (<http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/apps/asqExt/ASQ>), North Carolina Dept. of Public Safety.

Justice Reinvestment Pursues Four Objectives






Criminal Justice Trends in Alabama

Guiding Principles

Justice Reinvestment Case Studies

Justice Reinvestment in Texas

Reduced Prison Population, Crime, and Recidivism




Reinvested \$241 million to expand treatment and diversion programs

- ✓ 36 percent reduction in parole revocations
- ✓ Crime rate is at a 40 year low

Justice Reinvestment in North Carolina

Improves Probation and Drops Prison Population



Reduce Volume and Length of Stay of Revocations from Supervision to Jail and Prison



DATA —————> POLICY CHANGE

Supervision violation hearings are time-consuming, frequently delayed, and often result in reinstatement on supervision

53%
of prison admissions are **probation revocations**

There are few meaningful graduated sanctions for minor condition violations

75%
of revocations are for **condition violations**
(drug use, absconding)

Administrative Jail Sanctions	&	Tailored Prison Sanctions
↓		↓
2-3 day sanction		90 day sanction
Capped at 6 days		Capped at 3 revocations

- Designed to:**
- Reduce violation hearings
 - Reduce time in court
 - Reduce jail time spent awaiting hearings

State and Counties Partnership Manages Misdemeanants Who Previously Underwent Costly Prison Stays



DATA → POLICY CHANGE

Misdemeanor offenders

were difficult to deal with efficiently in prisons designed for more serious felons with longer sentences

Original Proposal:

**Shift them
to county jails**

1/4

of prison admissions
were **misdemeanor
offenders**

3 months

average
length of stay

Statewide Misdemeanor
Confinement Program



Policy allows misdemeanor
offenders in county jails with:

- Sheriff approval
- Bed space capacity
- Reimbursement from new state fund, supported by fees

Improve Correction and Parole Processes by Reserving Prison Space for Those Who Have Caused the Greatest Harm



DATA —————> POLICY CHANGE

Guidelines

Corrections



Create guidelines for preparing inmates for parole before they reach completion of the fixed term

Parole




Create guidelines for prioritizing prison space for the most violent and greatest-risk offenders

Include risk assessment as part of parole decision-making criteria




Retain discretion in individual cases

Idaho average **time served** was nearly **double** the national average for property and drug offenses



Idaho's average time served in prison was **207%** of the fixed term

States Are Reinvesting a Portion of Savings into Public Safety Strategies

STATE	FINDING	REINVESTMENT
<div>West Virginia</div> 	Substance use needs contributing to probation and parole violations	Reinvest \$2.5 million in substance use treatment focused on higher-risk probationers and parolees with higher needs
<div>Hawaii</div> 	Victims lack confidence that restitution orders will be managed effectively	Increase, by statute, prison-based restitution collections, reinvest in 15 victim service positions, and track collections using a database
<div>Ohio</div> 	Despite substantial community correction program investment, probation failures account for close to one third of prison admissions	Reinvest \$10 million in funding for improving probation, including performance-incentive grants

Next Steps

Emerging Questions and Possible Areas of Analysis

How does sentencing affect distribution of offenders across the system?

- ☐ How are pretrial, probation violator, and sentenced offender populations affecting county jail populations?
- ☐ What factors impact placement of offenders on various sentencing options?
- ☐ Do certain sentencing patterns drive prison pressures?


Is prison prioritized for those who pose the greatest danger to the community?

- ☐ What is affecting inmate length of stay?
- ☐ Are prison and parole processes operationalized to prevent system delays?
- ☐ Are programs unnecessarily oriented behind prison wall instead of being delivered in the community where they can have greater impact?

Does community supervision focus on people who pose the greatest risk of re-offense?

- ☐ Are admission criteria in place to ensure that programs focus on higher-risk offenders?
- ☐ How are probation lengths determined and how do they affect probation officer resources?
- ☐ What quality-assurance assessments and outcome evaluations are used to determine recidivism impact?

Proposed Project Timeline



Thank You



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